

EXHIBIT 8

REDACTED

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION

THE STATE OF TEXAS, et)
al.,)
) Case No.
Plaintiffs,) 4:20-cv-00957-SDJ
)
vs.) Hon. Sean D. Jordan
)
GOOGLE LLC,)
)
Defendants.)

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2024

CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER

- - -

Videotaped deposition of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], held at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer,
100 Bishopsgate, London, United Kingdom,
commencing at 9:25 a.m. British Summer Time,
on the above date, before Carrie A. Campbell,
Registered Diplomate Reporter, Certified
Realtime Reporter, Illinois, California &
Texas Certified Shorthand Reporter, Missouri,
Kansas, Louisiana & New Jersey Certified
Court Reporter.

- - -

Job No. MDLG6633025

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13 V I D E O G R A P H E R :

CHRIS RITONA,

14 Golkow Litigation Services

15 - - -

1 VIDEOGRAPHER: We are now on
2 the record. My name is Chris Ritona.
3 I am the videographer for Golkow
4 Litigation Services.

5 Today's date is April 17, 2024,
6 and the time is approximately
7 9:25 a.m. British Summer Time.

8 This remote video deposition is
9 being held in the matter of the State
10 of Texas, et al., versus Google LLC,
11 for the US District Court, for the
12 Eastern District of Texas, Herman
13 Division, Civil Action
14 Number 4:20-CV-00957-SDJ. And the
15 deponent today is [REDACTED].

16 All parties to this deposition
17 are appearing remotely and have agreed
18 to the witness being sworn in
19 remotely.

20 Due to the nature of remote
21 reporting, please pause briefly before
22 speaking to ensure all parties are
23 heard completely.

24 Will counsel please identify
25 themselves for the record?

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1 MR. HILLEGAS: Peter Hillegas
2 of Norton Rose Fulbright on behalf of
3 the State of Texas.

4 Also with me is Jiang Wu, also
5 of the State of Texas -- also of
6 Norton Rose Fulbright for the State of
7 Texas.

8 And for the plaintiff,
9 Mr. Jonathan Jaffe.

10 MR. EWALT: Andrew Ewalt from
11 Freshfields on behalf of Google.

12 With me is my colleague Tyler
13 Garrett, also from Freshfields, and
14 [REDACTED] from Google.

15 Mr. [REDACTED], Mr. Garrett and I
16 are all present in the room with the
17 witness.

18 VIDEOGRAPHER: Thank you.

19 The court reporter today is
20 Carrie Campbell, and she will now
21 please swear in the witness.

22
23 [REDACTED],
24 of lawful age, having been first duly sworn
25 to tell the truth, the whole truth and

1 nothing but the truth, deposes and says on
2 behalf of the Plaintiffs, as follows:

3
4 DIRECT EXAMINATION

5 QUESTIONS BY MR. HILLEGAS:

6 Q. Good morning, [REDACTED].

7 Could you please state your
8 full name for the record?

9 A. My name is [REDACTED].

10 Q. Where do you live?

11 A. Currently I live in Zumikon in
12 Switzerland.

13 Q. Where are you today?

14 A. Right now, I'm in London.

15 Q. Do you work for Google?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. What is the address of the
18 location for Google where you work?

19 A. That would be
20 Brandschenkestrasse 110 in Zurich.

21 Q. [REDACTED], have you ever been
22 deposed before?

23 A. No, this is my first
24 deposition.

25 Q. So I'll lay out the rules for

1 Q. When did you start working at
2 Google?

3 A. I believe it was October 2005.

4 Q. Was that immediately after you
5 received your Ph.D.?

6 A. It was a year after. Or it
7 depends kind of when I left grad school
8 versus when the Ph.D. was formally granted.
9 I had a year of postdoc.

10 Q. Where did you do your postdoc
11 research?

12 A. At Rutgers University and at
13 Bell Labs.

14 Q. Bell Labs is also in New
15 Jersey?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. Do you know what a second-price
18 auction is?

19 A. I have a general idea.

20 Q. What's a second-price auction?

21 A. So it's a type of auction for
22 selling one item where you have one seller,
23 multiple bidders.

24 The bidders -- each bidder gets
25 to submit a bid, and then the highest bid

1 wins. And they pay the second price, which
2 depends on the flavor of the auction. It's
3 either the second highest bid or sometimes
4 you have floor prices or zero prices or
5 whatever you call them, in which case the
6 winning bidder would pay the maximum of the
7 second highest competing bid or the floor
8 price.

9 Q. What are the benefits of
10 running a second-price auction?

11 A. I mean, well, what are the
12 benefits of running an auction? If you want
13 to sell an item, it's one of possible ways of
14 going about selling your item.

15 Q. What are the benefits of a
16 second-price auction specifically?

17 A. It's one of the auction
18 formats. In the academic literature, kind of
19 it's the textbook example of an
20 incentive-compatible auction where you can
21 prove a mathematical theorem for a bidder in
22 kind of the textbook setting.

23 The bidder -- the bidder's
24 strategy is to submit a bid that equals
25 their -- their true value -- or their value,

1 how much they are willing to pay for the item
2 under consideration.

3 Q. And that's because they won't
4 actually have to pay the full amount.

5 Right?

6 A. So if you want to go through
7 the full analysis, it's a case analysis. You
8 can say, well, what if you bid higher, what
9 can happen. What if you bid lower than
10 your -- than your value for the item. And
11 this type of case analysis lets you prove a
12 theorem saying that without loss of
13 generality, the bidder might as well submit a
14 bid equal to how much they value the item.

15 Q. And what are the benefits of a
16 second-price auction for a pub -- for a
17 seller?

18 A. So it depends on, again, the
19 environment, what is being sold. Lots of
20 considerations. So if you are a seller, you
21 might want to consider different auction
22 formats and pick whatever format makes sense
23 for you.

24 Q. So my question is for a
25 second-price auction. Why would a seller

1 choose a second-price auction?

2 MR. EWALT: Objection. Form.

3 THE WITNESS: So I can offer
4 some reasons. I can speculate.

5 So second-price auction is a
6 form of auction that doesn't require
7 multiple rounds. So it's a
8 single-round auction. Everybody
9 submits a sealed bid, and then a
10 winner is declared.

11 So it's not good -- it's good
12 for an environment where you cannot
13 afford multiple iterations. Like
14 there are auctions where people can
15 submit multiple bids over time. This
16 is not one of those formats.

17 So it's a kind of single-shot
18 auction format that's over in one
19 round. There's not multiple rounds.

20 QUESTIONS BY MR. HILLEGAS:

21 Q. So one of the benefits of a
22 second-price auction is it's fast?

23 MR. EWALT: Objection. Form.

24 THE WITNESS: So it's not an
25 iterative auction format. It's a

1 but I believe it was a flavor of that idea,
2 that you would pay one cent more than the
3 next highest bid.

4 Q. Do you know what a first-price
5 auction is?

6 A. I believe I do.

7 Q. What is a first-price auction?

8 A. So first-price auction, again,
9 it's a single -- a single-shot auction where
10 everybody submits a sealed bid, and then the
11 auctioneer looks at all of the bids. The
12 highest bids wins, and the winner pays
13 whatever bid they submitted.

14 There is also a flavor with
15 reserve prices where the auctioneer can
16 decide that they will not sell the item
17 unless the bid exceeds a preset reserve
18 price.

19 Q. What are the benefits of a
20 first-price auction for the seller?

21 A. Oh, it's an auction format. If
22 you want to sell an item using an auction,
23 first-price auction is a common auction
24 format.

25 Q. First-price auction is a common

1 auction format, but I've asked you what are
2 the benefits of a first-price auction for the
3 seller.

4 Are you able to identify any?

5 MR. EWALT: Objection to form.

6 THE WITNESS: Benefits. So in
7 some cases it's simpler because the
8 computation of the transaction price
9 doesn't depend on anything except the
10 winning bid.

11 So if you are thinking about
12 implementing it as a computer program,
13 the program is slightly simpler. So
14 that's what I would name.

15 And if you were into auction
16 theory, you could kind of try and
17 study the dynamics and how bidders
18 respond to different auction formats
19 and kind of study, for example, if
20 you're a seller, what are your
21 objectives, and which auction format
22 best achieves the objectives that you
23 have.

24 QUESTIONS BY MR. HILLEGAS:

25 Q. So ease of computation is a

1 benefit to the exchange.

2 Right?

3 MR. EWALT: Objection to form.

4 THE WITNESS: So I wouldn't say

5 it's a huge benefit. Kind of -- it's

6 not so difficult to implement

7 different auction rules.

8 It could be a benefit in

9 various constrained environments

10 where, for example -- or -- okay. So

11 I would say there are many different

12 environments where you might consider

13 running an auction, and in some of

14 them, kind of certain auction rules

15 might be preferable to others.

16 QUESTIONS BY MR. HILLEGAS:

17 Q. But the seller is not the one
18 building the auction.

19 Correct?

20 A. So, again, it depends on the
21 environment. I can imagine sellers who would
22 build their own auction logic. I can imagine
23 environments where a seller would outsource
24 the auctioning logic to another party. So I
25 would say it depends on context.

1 Q. In the context of an exchange
2 with a seller and a buyer, the seller is
3 participating, right? They're not running
4 the auction?

5 MR. EWALT: Objection to form.

6 THE WITNESS: So I would say if
7 you assumed the existence of an
8 exchange, then, yes, the exchange
9 would be a separate entity from the
10 seller.

11 QUESTIONS BY MR. HILLEGAS:

12 Q. And assuming the existence of
13 an exchange, what are the benefits of a
14 first-price auction to the seller?

15 A. So it's a -- so it depends on
16 the seller's objectives and also the choice
17 the seller might have where -- like, are
18 there multiple exchanges the seller might
19 want to work with, in which case the seller
20 should consider the merits of the different
21 computing options.

22 Q. So it's your position that a
23 benefit of a first-price auction to a seller
24 is that they can engage in multiple auctions?

25 MR. EWALT: Objection to form.

1 auction, which in general is in the --
2 in the seller's control.

3 There is also the question of
4 reserve prices. Would the seller wish
5 to impose some kind of minimum price
6 on bidders.

7 There are various formats where
8 people might want to charge an
9 entrance fee, again, depending --
10 depending on the format and what
11 they're trying to accomplish.

12 So it depends a lot -- and of
13 course there are all questions about
14 how much information do you have about
15 an item being sold. Are you bidding
16 with -- what is -- what is each
17 bidder's understanding of the item
18 being auctioned.

19 So I would say there's a lot of
20 nuance that kind of prevents me from
21 giving a very general answer.

22 QUESTIONS BY MR. HILLEGAS:

23 Q. So because you don't understand
24 the rules of an auction, you aren't able to
25 identify a benefit to running that auction.

1 Right?

2 MR. EWALT: Objection to form.

3 THE WITNESS: I can say in a
4 specific context, maybe like the
5 simplicity of charging the winner the
6 first -- the price they -- the amount
7 they bid, if you like that aspect of
8 the auction, then by all means, go
9 ahead and use that auction format.

10 QUESTIONS BY MR. HILLEGAS:

11 Q. Are you able to identify any
12 downsides of using a first-price auction over
13 a second-price auction for a seller, holding
14 all of your variables constant?

15 A. So the theoretical answer and
16 the answer why many academics historically
17 have preferred studying second-price auctions
18 was that in a first-price auction a bidder
19 needs to think about their bidding strategy.
20 And their bidding strategy, at least in a
21 theoretical model, depends on how much other
22 people -- or on your beliefs about how much
23 other people might be bidding.

24 So if you expect very little
25 competition, you can save money by bidding

1 lower. Whereas if you expect tight
2 competition, then you might want to bid
3 higher.

4 And so if this is kind of how
5 the bidding strategy for a bidder looks like,
6 it's kind of complex because you have to make
7 these predictions about other people's
8 bidding behavior and even their presence and
9 their evaluations. And so from an academic
10 perspective, doing this is complicated for a
11 bidder.

12 And so that would be one reason
13 for why kind of academically you might want
14 to prefer an auction format where the bidding
15 strategy for the bidder can be simpler, such
16 as an incentive-compatible auction, of which
17 a second-price auction would be an example.

18 Q. Do you believe that auctions
19 should be fair?

20 A. In general, I'm all for
21 fairness.

22 Q. Do you believe that people
23 participating in auctions should be able to
24 know what the rules of the auction are?


25 A. I think it depends on the

CERTIFICATE

I, CARRIE A. CAMPBELL, Registered Diplomat Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter and Certified Shorthand Reporter, do hereby certify that prior to the commencement of the examination, [REDACTED], was duly sworn by me to testify to the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

I DO FURTHER CERTIFY that the foregoing is a verbatim transcript of the testimony as taken stenographically by and before me at the time, place and on the date hereinbefore set forth, to the best of my ability.

I DO FURTHER CERTIFY that I am neither a relative nor employee nor attorney nor counsel of any of the parties to this action, and that I am neither a relative nor employee of such attorney or counsel, and that I am not financially interested in the action.



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Dated: April 18, 2024